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Abstract 
We show that creditors do not just ensure that inefficient investment is not undertaken, 
but also do not preclude efficient investment. Examining what happens following a debt 
covenant violation, a situation through which creditors acquire some control rights over 
the firm, we find that investment declines when the firm has few growth opportunities 
but it may increase otherwise. The results are robust to the use of different proxies for 
growth opportunities. The firm’s performance improves but it suffers dividend cuts and 
increased CEO turnover. The results suggest that creditors consider the benefits of 
growth opportunities as a source of future cash flows to meet outstanding debt 
obligations. 
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The control rights over the investment decisions of a firm typically rest with its shareholders, 
except when the firm fails on interest or principal debt payments or breaches covenants included in 
debt contracts. Either of these situations gives creditors the right to accelerate loan payments or 
terminate loan agreements. In an attempt to prevent such outcomes, creditors gain instead some 
influence over the firm and acquire some control rights that they can use to reshape its investment 
policy (e.g., Aghion and Bolton 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). Most theory and some empirical 
evidence focus on their role in preventing inefficient investment, and if unsuccessful, in punishing the 
firm and its manager by, for example, constraining or reducing investment (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Myers 1977; Smith and Warner 1979; Chava and Roberts 2008; Nini et al. 2012).1 We 
contribute to this literature by presenting evidence that creditors’ influence on investment decisions 
can be more complex. It may be in the best interest of creditors to assess the potential of a firm’s 
business and support managers and shareholders in improving the firm instead of simply punishing 
them. As a result, creditors can play a role in shaping the firm’s investment policy that may be 
constrained or boosted in periods in which they can exert a tighter control over the firm.  
Specifically, we examine changes in a firm’s investment and performance following a debt 
covenant violation, a situation through which creditors acquire some control rights over the firm, 
taking into account the growth opportunities of the firm at the time of violation. On the one hand, 
growth opportunities are often a source of agency conflicts between the shareholders and creditors of 
a firm as shareholders’ investment decisions may lead to situations in which creditors are unlikely to 
get their money back (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). On the other hand, growth 
opportunities are ultimately a source of future cash flows to meet outstanding debt obligations, and for 
this reason, are valuable to shareholders and creditors alike. In fact, growth opportunities have been 
documented empirically as important to determine the bargaining power of a firm to negotiate 
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 Daniels and Ramirez (2011), Lee and Sharpe (2009) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) find empirical 
evidence consistent with the monitoring role of banks. 
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concessions with creditors (Roberts and Sufi 2009a). For all these reasons, creditors may want to 
assess the growth opportunities of a firm at the time of violation before deciding on their preferred 
course of action. This seeming leniency may also stem from the fact that if creditors appear to be 
insisting on actions that favor their interests to the detriment of the firm’s long-term business strategy, 
they may be liable to shareholders for resulting damages. 
 We find that investment, as measured by capital expenditures, declines following a covenant 
violation when the firm has few growth opportunities at the time of violation. More precisely, there is 
a decline in investment of around 0.8% of capital in the quarter following the violation – a decline of 
20.5% relative to average investment in non-violating quarters. However, investment can increase by 
0.6% of capital in the quarter following the covenant violation when the firm has many growth 
opportunities at the time of violation – an increase of 13.3% relative to average investment in non-
violating quarters. A similar pattern arises when we use mergers and acquisitions as an alternative 
measure for investment. We also look at how a debt covenant violation relates to changes in operating 
performance, as measured by the return-on-assets (ROA) of the firm. We find that a covenant 
violation is associated with an increase in ROA of around 0.4% and 0.6% in the quarter following the 
violation when the firm has few and many growth opportunities, respectively. The direction of all the 
effects persists for at least two consecutive quarters after the violation.2 
This does not mean, however, that creditors do not support stricter actions by managers and/or 
shareholders regarding other aspects of corporate policies. In this line, we find that dividend payments 
to shareholders decrease and CEO turnover increases following a covenant violation, regardless of the 
level of growth opportunities.  
 The empirical strategy developed in the paper requires two main steps: first, to identify firms 
that violate covenants; and second, to classify firms according to their growth opportunities. 
Regarding the first step, we identify technical violations of covenants, or technical default, which 
correspond to violations of a covenant other than the one requiring the payment of interest or principal 
                                                          
2
 As a robustness test available upon request, we find similar results four quarters after the covenant violation. 
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and that involve accounting-based measures. This approach goes in line with other studies (e.g., 
Chava and Roberts 2008; Demiroglu and James 2010). In the second step, we follow standard 
convention in the literature and construct two measures of growth opportunities based on the market-
to-book ratio of the assets and on the level of research and development (R&D) expenditures to sales 
of a firm (e.g., Adam and Goyal 2008, Billet et al. 2007, Goyal et al. 2002). 
This paper is related to the literature on the effects of external financing on investment. The 
seminal papers by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977) and Smith and Warner (1979) show 
how debt financing has the potential to generate agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors 
over the investment and financing policies of the firm. These papers also explain how to mitigate such 
agency conflicts by using debt covenants, for instance. In fact, Chava and Roberts (2008) show 
empirically that debt covenant violations have a negative impact on corporate investment as creditors 
use their control rights to exert greater influence over corporate policies. They also use five proxies 
for agency and information problems between borrowers and lenders to show that the effect on 
investment is heterogeneous across firms. These proxies measure financial variables of the firm or 
constitute characteristics of the loan contract that are valued by creditors at the loan starting date. The 
authors’ idea is to measure the ability of creditors to prevent firm misbehavior prior to the violation, 
which is reflected in the severity of the effect of a covenant violation on investment. Our approach is 
different in the sense that it is linked to the business activity of the firm - growth opportunities - as 
measured at the time of violation. In this sense, it allows for an assessment of the reaction of creditors 
to eventual new circumstances faced by the firm after the loan starting date. 
The paper is also related to the literature on the resolution and consequences of technical 
default. This literature goes back to Beneish and Press (1993, 1995), Chen and Wei (1993) and 
Sweeney (1994). More recent empirical evidence shows how covenant violations affect future debt 
contracts: Nini et al. (2009) find that these debt contracts impose stronger restrictions on managers, 
and Sufi (2007) provides evidence that banks limit revolving lines of credit to violating firms. Closer 
to our paper are Roberts and Sufi (2009b) and Nini et al. (2012), who look at more immediate 
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consequences of covenant violations. The former document a decline in the issuance of new debt 
following a covenant violation, while the latter note that a covenant violation is followed by an 
increase in CEO turnover, a decrease in capital expenditures, a reduction in the use of debt and in 
shareholders payouts, among others. Their results suggest that creditors exert influence on the 
corporate governance of firms even outside bankruptcy and liquidation. 
 Our contribution to this strand of the literature is to provide additional evidence of the role of 
creditors in the resolution of technical default by showing that in contrast to what has been 
documented so far, creditors do not always respond to a covenant violation by demanding stronger 
restrictions on a firm’s behavior. Moreover, we also show that creditors seem to care about the growth 
opportunities of a firm and use them to assess firms when in breach of debt covenants. In this sense, 
our analysis is ex-post as opposed to an analysis ex-ante that looks at how growth opportunities affect 
the structure of debt contracts in terms of choice, number and tightness of covenants included in such 
contracts (e.g., Kahan and Yermack 1998; Nash et al. 2003; Bradley and Roberts 2004; Goyal 2005; 
Billett et al. 2007; Chava et al. 2010; Reisel 2010; Demiroglu and James 2010). 
 Finally, this paper shows that covenant violations can be associated with improvements in 
performance. This is in line with results by Nini et al. (2009) and Andrade and Kaplan (1998), the 
latter in the context of LBO transactions. This paper uses the same measure of operating performance 
as in Nini et al. (2009) but their focus is mainly on the impact on performance from including new 
capital expenditure restrictions in debt contracts following a covenant violation. Nini et al. (2012) also 
look at operating and stock price performance following a covenant violation but do not address the 
role of growth opportunities at the time of violation. This point is important for us because the fact 
that a firm experiences an improvement in performance following a covenant violation after 
controlling for growth opportunities implies that creditors understand the firm’s business conditions. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses, Section 
3 discusses the data and the details about the sample construction, Section 4 presents the econometric 
methodology and the results, and Section 5 concludes. All tables are relegated to the Appendix. 
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2 Creditor Control Rights and Growth Opportunities: Hypotheses Development 
Following a covenant violation, creditors acquire some control rights over the firm and may 
demand concessions or impose constraints on the violating firm that affect investment. For example, 
creditors may incorporate explicit restrictions on capital expenditures (e.g., Beneish and Press 1993; 
Nini et al. 2009), or they may increase interest rates or reduce the amount that the firm is allowed to 
borrow (e.g., Beneish and Press 1993; Chen and Wei 1993). As a result, Chava and Roberts (2008) 
and Demiroglu and James (2010) show that without controlling for the growth opportunities of a firm, 
covenant violations have a direct and negative impact on investment. 
Another concern that creditors may have is to whether the firm is spending its existing 
resources inefficiently or in too high-risk investments (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977). 
In this case, creditors may exert pressure for managers to tackle such situations following a covenant 
violation, which provides an additional reason for the subsequent decline in investment documented 
empirically in violating firms. Nevertheless, the fact that a firm is investing efficiently or not may 
depend directly on the firm’s investment opportunity set. Firms with relatively more growth 
opportunities at the time of violation are expected to have a wider portfolio of profitable projects to 
choose from, and as a result, are perceived as less likely to misuse creditors’ money. For this reason, 
the adjustment in investment required when a firm has many growth opportunities may differ from 
that required when a firm has few growth opportunities. 
In addition, growth opportunities represent a source of future cash flows. Existing creditors 
should be particularly concerned with getting their money back and they know that to achieve it the 
firm should not be cutting back on potentially profitable investment. In fact, Roberts and Sufi (2009a) 
look at renegotiations of debt contract terms and find that growth opportunities give firms some 
leeway in these renegotiations precisely because these opportunities are valued by creditors, and 
hence, can increase the bargaining position of the firm.  
Finally, Berlin and Mester (1992) and Gârleanu and Zwiebel (2009) look specifically at debt 
covenants and show that they might be too severe or set too tightly whenever there is asymmetric 
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information about the quality of the firm. Having many growth opportunities is a characteristic of the 
firm that is plausibly related to asymmetric information. But having more or tighter covenants also 
means that a firm is likely to be regularly monitored by creditors (e.g., Rajan and Winton 1995; Park 
2000). If this is the case, a covenant violation is likely to be less of a surprise to creditors and this may 
dictate that they react in a milder manner when it actually occurs.  
From the point of view of creditors, all these aspects should favor a firm that happens to have 
many growth opportunities when it violates a covenant relative to the case when the violating firm has 
few growth opportunities. This idea leads us to state our first hypothesis in the following terms: 
Hypothesis 1: Investment declines following a covenant violation when the firm has few growth 
opportunities at the time of violation. However, it declines less (or even increases) when the firm has 
many growth opportunities at the time of violation. 
There is evidence that indicates that most firms that violate a covenant rarely end up in 
bankruptcy (e.g., Sweeney 1994; Gopalakrishnan and Parkash 1995; Dichev and Skinner 2002). This 
implies that these firms should return to normal levels of activity and experience improvements in 
performance at some point after violating a covenant. Moreover, in the seminal papers by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) the authors suggest that allocating control rights to creditors 
reduces the potential for shareholders to engage in actions that transfer wealth from creditors to 
themselves and outside the firm. In fact, empirical evidence by Nini et al. (2012) reveals that firms 
that violate covenants are more closely monitored by their creditors, with consequences in terms of 
increased CEO turnover and/or decreased shareholders payouts, among others. They also mention 
some informal mechanisms of creditors’ intervention such as providing advice and requiring better 
reporting and liquidity management. In addition, Ferreira et al. (2012) show that creditors prefer a 
more independent board of directors following a covenant violation. 
Finally, the inclusion of covenants in debt contracts provides itself a very good monitoring 
device for creditors as debt covenants allow for the early detection and swift resolution of problems 
inside a firm (e.g., Rajan and Winton 1995; Park 2000). 
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Therefore, it is not unreasonable to expect improvements in the performance of a violating firm 
shortly after a covenant violation, irrespective of the level of growth opportunities. 
Hypothesis 2: Firm performance improves following a covenant violation, irrespective of the level of 
growth opportunities at the time of violation. 
3 Data and Sample Construction 
3.1 Databases 
 The databases used in the paper are Compustat for accounting information and Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s (LPC) Dealscan for loan information. We start by using the data on covenant violations 
from Amir Sufi’s website, which we cross-refer with Dealscan to obtain the information on the 
covenants included in each loan. We focus on dollar denominated bank loans to non-financial U.S. 
firms during the period from 1996 to 2008. We use quarterly accounting data because most firms 
report their financial statements to creditors on a quarterly basis to allow for monitoring on the 
compliance with the covenant requirements. The variables constructed are defined in Table 1. 
---- Insert Table 1 about here ---- 
3.2 Covenants and Covenant Violations 
There are many covenants that constrain managerial discretion by fixing minimum or 
maximum thresholds on different accounting ratios and other variables related to the activity of the 
firm. The Dealscan database reports information on 15 different covenants.3  
An advantage of bank loans over other sources of debt financing is that bank loan covenants 
can be customized to suit the specific needs of the borrowing firm. However, this also means that 
covenants might not be uniform and standardized across different bank loan contracts. For these 
                                                          
3
 These covenants are: Min Current Ratio; Min Net Worth; Min Tangible Net Worth; Min Fixed Charge 
Coverage; Min Debt Service Coverage; Min Interest Coverage; Min Cash Interest Coverage; Max Leverage 
Ratio; Max Debt to Cash-Flow; Max Debt to Tangible Net Worth; Max Debt to Equity; Required Lenders (%); 
Term Changes (%), Collateral Release (%); Max Investment Basket. 
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reasons, we follow Chava and Roberts (2008) and focus on covenants involving the current ratio, net 
worth and tangible net worth that fix a minimum threshold on the corresponding accounting variable. 
Not only do they appear frequently in loan contracts in general (e.g., Dichev and Skinner 2002) but 
they are also relatively standardized and unambiguous. Moreover, they have been identified as those 
that are most likely to lead to technical default (e.g., Beneish and Press 1993; Chen and Wei 1993; 
Sweeney 1994). Hence, to construct the final sample we focus on those firms that are bound by either 
a current ratio or a (tangible) net worth covenant at least once during the sample period according to 
the information provided by Dealscan. 
 We restrict the sample to loans with information on loan amount, maturity date and spread over 
the LIBOR (all-in spread drawn), which are matched to firm accounting information using company 
name and loan origination date. Finally, we exclude all firms for which we do not have information on 
the variables investment, ROA, market-to-book ratio, and on the accounting measures linked to the 
covenants of interest to us that are the current ratio, net worth and tangible net worth. 
We take each loan in the sample and consider that the firm is bound by the covenant until the 
loan maturity date. The basic unit of observation in Dealscan is a loan (or facility) and many of these 
loans are packaged together into deals. Hence, loans within one deal may have different maturity 
dates but are going to overlap until the maturity date of the loan with the shortest maturity. Different 
deals can also overlap for some time. In this case we consider the minimum covenant threshold across 
all active loans at a given quarter as the relevant threshold for each covenant.4  
It is also possible that a new loan is taken to refinance a previous one. Dealscan provides some 
information on whether a loan is a refinancing, however, this information is only available for a 
limited number of loans and it is not always clear which past loan is being refinanced. In order to 
avoid double counting, we disregard any past loans that are active when a new loan occurs unless it is 
                                                          
4
 This is reasonable given that many loans have cross-default clauses, which often means that if the firm is in 
technical default in one loan, it is automatically considered as in technical default in all of its outstanding loans. 
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clear from Dealscan that the new loan is not refinancing a previous loan. As a drawback, we may lose 
information but at least we are certain that loans that no longer exist are excluded from the analysis.  
Given this, we are able to identify at each quarter whether the firm is bound by a covenant and 
the corresponding threshold. The next step is to compare each covenant threshold with the relevant 
accounting variable at each quarter. If the accounting variable exceeds the covenant threshold there is 
no covenant violation; otherwise there is a covenant violation. More formally, the variable “Covenant 
violation” for firm i at year-quarter t is defined as follows: 
                 (1) 
where ki,t is the observed accounting variable and k0i,t is the relevant covenant threshold. We consider 
that a firm is in violation if at least one of the aforementioned covenants (current ratio, net worth and 
tangible net worth) is violated.  
One important consideration in the way we define a covenant violation is the issue of waivers 
granted by creditors. When a firm is not in compliance with a covenant its creditors face a decision 
either to demand immediate repayment or to waive the violation. Expression (1) provides a way to 
identify a covenant violation but it does not exclude that such violation may be granted a waiver by 
creditors, in which case any effect that we find in the analysis below would come from a different 
channel other than the covenant violation itself. This would be a serious concern if waivers were 
generally granted free of concessions. Two comments are in order in this case. First, a waiver is 
generally received in exchange for other concessions. This is noted by Beneish and Press (1993), 
Chen and Wei (1993), Sweeney (1994) and Nini et al. (2012). For this reason, the latter count waivers 
as violations. Therefore, we believe that possible distortions from not accounting for waivers in the 
analysis below are limited. Second, treating waivers that are granted free of concessions as real 
violations should work against finding any significant results. However, to make sure that we are not 
biasing our analysis in any significant way, in Section 4.2 we present some results regarding the 













 Hence, following the process described above, we identify 21573 firm-quarter observations, 
which correspond to 1862 different firms. There are 1942 firm-quarter observations that correspond to 
events of violation of at least one of the aforementioned covenants, which constitute 9% of the total 
number of observations. This represents 350 firms out of a total of 1862 firms, i.e. 18.79% of all firms 
in our sample. To sum up, covenant violations seem to occur rather frequently and affect a significant 
number of firms in our sample.5 
3.3 Summary Statistics and Growth Opportunity Proxies 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for a number of key variables related to firm 
characteristics. The variable that measures default or bankruptcy risk is the (Altman’s) Z-score, which 
is inversely related to the probability of bankruptcy. It is worth noting that the average Z-score in our 
sample is 6.40. This is well beyond the critical threshold of 1.81, which is considered as the level 
below which there is a high probability of a firm entering bankruptcy. Hence, the firms in our sample 
seem to show considerable financial strength. This conclusion is confirmed by the performance 
figures: ROA has a mean value of 2.37% and the market-to-book ratio has a value of 1.94.6 
---- Insert Table 2 about here ---- 
In Table 3, we use the market-to-book asset ratio, defined as the sum of the market value of 
equity and total debt divided by total assets, to classify a firm according to its growth opportunities. 
This classification is important because, as explained in Section 2, we need to distinguish between 
firms that are perceived as able to generate more and less cash-flows in the future. To do so, we use 
the simplest possible classification method. Following Brailsford and Yeoh (2004), Broussard et al. 
(2004) or Schlingemann (2004), we compare each firm’s market-to-book asset ratio to the median 
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 As a reference point, in Sufi’s database that includes violations of all covenants there are 16.56% of covenant 
violations (3572 observations) that correspond to 644 different firms (34.58% of the total). 
6
 These numbers are in line with those from Chava and Roberts (2008) for non-financial firms in the merged 
CRSP-Compustat database for the period from 1987 to 2005. 
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computed for the whole sample.7 The idea is that firms with high market-to-book asset values are 
likely to have many positive NPV new projects to choose from (relative to their assets in place), and 
therefore, have the possibility to invest their resources in a variety of new profitable projects, whereas 
firms with low market-to-book asset values have more limited growth prospects (relative to their 
assets in place) and are perceived as less likely to be able to invest in positive NPV new projects. 
Hence, we create a dummy variable that equals 1 when the market-to-book asset ratio of the firm is 
above the sample median value for the last four consecutive quarters, and equals 0 otherwise. When 
the dummy equals 1, the firm is classified as having many growth opportunities. Otherwise, the firm 
is classified as having few growth opportunities. With this restriction, 32.92% of the observations 
correspond to quarters with “many growth opportunities”.8 
We find that a firm shows significantly better average operating performance (ROA) and 
measures of market value in quarters of many, instead of few, growth opportunities. Having many 
growth opportunities is also associated with lower average leverage ratios and larger average Z-score 
values i.e., lower probabilities of going bankrupt. This concurs with the fact that average loan spreads 
are lower in quarters with many growth opportunities. Unsurprisingly, a firm is also less likely to 
violate covenants in these quarters.  
---- Insert Table 3 about here ---- 
                                                          
7
 The results also hold when we use the median value of the market-to-book ratio for the industrial sector (at a 
secondary SIC code level) instead of the sample median to classify a firm according to its growth opportunities. 
8
 Using a dummy variable allows us to easily recognize when the firm has many growth opportunities over a 
period of time, more specifically over four consecutive quarters. The reason why we focus on a period instead of 
a point in time is to make sure that we are in fact picking up growth-firms and excluding firms that happen to be 
above the median by chance at a given quarter. Moreover, we are excluding the possibility that an unexpected 
jump in growth opportunities contemporaneous to the covenant violation may drive the effect in the firm’s 




Overall, these preliminary results are encouraging in that they provide some support to our 
hypothesis that the level of growth opportunities is a key characteristic to differentiate between firms 
whenever there is a covenant violation, and for this reason, it should matter to creditors. Moreover, 
the results highlight the importance of controlling for these characteristics in a multivariate analysis to 
make sure that we exclude other possible interpretations of our results. A more complete econometric 
analysis is developed in Section 4.  
As explained above, our proxy for growth opportunities is based on the market-to-book asset 
ratio of the firm. Adam and Goyal (2008) look at different proxies for growth opportunities and 
conclude that the market-to-book asset ratio is the best proxy as it shows the highest correlation with 
the firm’s actual investment opportunities. For this reason we use it as our main proxy. Nevertheless, 
looking at the summary statistics presented above, one could argue that firms with high market-to-
book asset ratios are simply those firms with lower expected costs of financial distress due to low 
default risk.9 Alternatively, they could be firms that are expected to maintain current high earnings in 
the future or even firms with high market valuations because they are considered as valuable additions 
to the portfolios of diversified investors. To ensure that we are not just identifying low default risk or 
high valuation firms instead of high growth firms, we also run alternative regressions using the level 
of R&D expenses over sales as a proxy for growth opportunities since firms generally engage in 
research and development to generate future investments.10 Moreover, this proxy is accounting-based 
instead of market-based and therefore excludes investor’s expectations about costs of financial 
distress and diversification considerations. Similarly to the procedure with the market-to-book asset 
                                                          
9
 Vassalou and Xing (2004) find that default risk is related to the market-to-book value of the firm. 
Nevertheless, our descriptive statistics in Tables 2 and 3 show that average Z-scores are quite high suggesting 
that default risk may not be an immediate concern. 
10
 Another proxy for growth opportunities that generates similar conclusions is the past sales growth rate of the 
firm. Either R&D expenses, past sales growth rate or both are used by Adam and Goyal 2008, Billet et al. 2007, 
Durnev and Kim (2005), Goyal et al. 2002, Johnson (2003), Rountree et al. (2008), among others. 
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ratio, the firm is classified as having many growth opportunities when the R&D-to-sales expenses, or 
R&D intensity, is above the sample median value for the last four consecutive quarters. It is classified 
as having few growth opportunities otherwise. 
4 Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate Analysis  
 Table 4 provides additional results focusing on investment and performance variables. Panel A 
reports correlations between the variables Investment, ROA, Market-to-book ratio and Covenant 
violation. Covenant violation is negatively (and significantly) related to Investment, ROA and to the 
Market-to-book ratio. This is in line with the results from Panel B, which presents a test of mean 
differences for the variables Investment, ΔInvestment (defined as the difference in Investment 
between two consecutive quarters), ROA, and Market-to-book ratio, between two subsamples. These 
subsamples are stratified according to whether the firm is in violation of a covenant or not. The 
numbers show that when a firm violates a covenant it presents worse performance variables in terms 
of ROA and Market-to-book ratio. Average Investment is lower in violating than in non-violating 
quarters. This result also holds for ΔInvestment, which is significantly different between violating and 
non-violating quarters but negative only in violating quarters. This suggests that average investment is 
non-decreasing in non-violating quarters but that it may decrease following a covenant violation. 
 Panel C presents a test of mean differences for the variables in Panel B, taking the violating and 
non-violating samples stratified according to whether the firm is classified as having many or few 
growth opportunities, as defined in section 3.3. Among the firms with many growth opportunities, 
violating firms invest more than non-violating firms with an average investment of 5.1% against 4.5% 
of capital. This relationship also holds for the variable ΔInvestment, by comparing 0.2% against 0.1% 
respectively. This is a surprising result that qualifies the results from Chava and Roberts (2008) or 
Demiroglu and James (2010). However, in the case of firms with few growth opportunities the results 
are the opposite and consistent with those from the previous two papers. For this group of firms, 
violating firms invest on average 2.9% of capital whereas non-violating firms invest on average 3.9% 
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of capital. The difference is significant and such pattern persists for the variable ΔInvestment. We find 
that a covenant violation entails a larger decrease in investment, - 0.8% compared to 0.1% for a non-
violating firm. These preliminary results provide some support to Hypothesis 1.  
Regarding the variables that measure performance, the results from Panels B and C are fairly 
consistent. A violating firm always shows worse performance than a non-violating firm in terms of 
average ROA. The results for the average Market-to-book ratio are in line with these ones. These 
results merit further investigation because, as argued in the previous section, covenant violations do 
not necessarily lead to bankruptcy and it is likely that creditors act to improve the performance of the 
firm following such violations. In the next section, we conduct a multivariate analysis on the 
relationship between covenant violation and the variables that measure investment and performance. 
---- Insert Table 4 about here ---- 
4.2 Multivariate Analysis: Implications for Investment 
 The aim of this section is to uncover the impact of a covenant violation, a situation through 
which creditors acquire some control rights over the firm, on investment depending on firm 
characteristics. We estimate the following empirical model: 
1 0 1 2
3 4 , 1
it it it
it it i t i t
Investment Covenant violation Covenant violation Growthopportunities
Growthopportunities X
                (2) 
where the variable Investmentit+ 1 is explained in terms of two dummy variables: Covenant violationit 
and Growth opportunitiesit, which identify a firm that violates a covenant and a firm with many (few) 
growth opportunities, respectively, as explained in section 3.3. Moreover, the model includes the 
interaction term between the two dummies, Covenant violationit× Growth opportunitiesit, and a set of 
control variables Xit. In this set of control variables we include the usual proxies for size (log of total 
assets), performance (ROA, Cash-flow), financial structure (Leverage ratio), liquidity (measured by 
cash) and default risk (Z-score). The empirical model in the expression is a firm- and year-quarter 
fixed effects estimation, given by ηi and νt respectively, with standard errors clustered at firm level. 
The random error term is denoted as εit+ 1 and it is assumed to be potentially heteroskedastic. 
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Motivated by Chava and Roberts (2008) and Demiroglu and James (2010), we also include in 
the set of controls the variable Default Distance, which is computed as follows for each covenant:  
Default distanceit= I(Covenantit)x(Accounting variableit – Covenant thresholdit) 
where I(.) is an indicator function that is equal to one if the loan includes one of the covenants 
considered in our study and zero otherwise. The squared value of the default distance is also included 
in order to account for potential non-linearities. 
Specifically, the idea is to compute the distance between the accounting variables current ratio, 
net worth and tangible net worth and the corresponding thresholds specified by the covenant. Then, 
we take the relative minimum of these three values to identify which of the three covenants is closest 
to the covenant threshold. If the firm is required to comply with two (or even only one) out of the 
three covenants at a given quarter, the default distance is computed using these two covenants (or one 
covenant). This variable is important because creditors’ reaction to a violation is likely to depend on 
by how much the firm breached a covenant threshold – creditors may be more lenient with firms 
which have just missed a covenant threshold than with firms which have exceed a covenant threshold 
by a wide margin. Moreover, it is possible that the firm may alter its investment behavior depending 
on how far away it is from violating a covenant (e.g. Chava and Roberts 2008; Demiroglu and James 
2010; Roberts and Sufi 2009b). For example, the firm may become more conservative as it 
approaches a covenant threshold with the purpose of avoiding a covenant violation. 
Using a firm fixed-effects estimation allows us to address the potential endogeneity problems 
linked to the firm-specific component of the error term (e.g., managerial abilities), which may be 
correlated with the variables that characterize the firm’s investment policy, as well as to eventual 
covenant violations. The parameters of interest are ȕ1 and ȕ2, which are expected to be negative and 
positive, respectively, according to Hypothesis 1 developed in section 2. 
We also estimate the model considered above taking as a dependent variable investment two 
quarters after the covenant violation (Investmentit+ 2). The idea is that presumably there is 
renegotiation between the firm and its creditors following the covenant violation. This renegotiation is 
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unlikely to take place immediately, in particular if it involves many creditors as with syndicated loans. 
In this case, we impose an additional condition that a covenant has not been violated at quarter t+ 1. 
This is done to eliminate confounding effects and conduct an effective evaluation of the marginal 
effects of a covenant violation at a given quarter on investment two quarters ahead without having to 
worry about what happened in between. The results are presented in Table 5A. In columns 1 and 3, 
we advance the dependent variable by one quarter (Investmentit+ 1), while in columns 2 and 4 we 
advance it by two quarters (Investmentit+ 2). In columns 1 and 2, growth opportunities are measured 
using the market-to-book asset ratio, whereas in columns 3 and 4, growth opportunities are measured 
using R&D intensity.  
Column 1 of Table 5A shows that covenant violations are associated with a decline in 
investment of 0.8% of capital in the quarter following the violation for firms with few growth 
opportunities. This number represents a decrease of 20.5% relative to an average investment rate of 
3.9% in non-violating quarters for firms with few growth opportunities (see Panel C from Table 4).11 
However, we find a positive and significant coefficient of 1.4% on the interaction term, which 
represents a net increase of 0.6% (1.4%-0.8%) in investment when a firm has many growth 
opportunities, and reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the covenant violation 
dummy and the interaction term is equal to zero: the null hypothesis that ȕ1 +ȕ2 = 0 is rejected with a 
p-value<0.01. The net increase of 0.6% represents an increase of 13.3% relative to an average 
investment rate of 4.5% in non-violating quarters for firms with many growth opportunities (see Panel 
C from Table 4). Such result suggests that in contrast to what happens with few growth opportunities, 
when a firm has many growth opportunities there is an increase in investment in spite of the violation. 
These results also hold in column 3 when we use R&D intensity as a proxy for growth opportunities. 
                                                          
11
 Chava and Roberts (2008) also show that there is a decrease of 0.8% of capital, using a different sample and a 




 The quantitative results in columns 2 and 4 are quite similar to those in columns 1 and 3. More 
specifically, there is a decline in investment of 0.6% of capital two quarters after the covenant 
violation when a firm has few growth opportunities. However, when it has many growth opportunities 
there is a net increase in investment of 1% (1.6%-0.6%) two quarters following the violation. We 
reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the covenant violation dummy and the 
interaction term is equal to zero (ȕ1 +ȕ2 = 0 is satisfied with a p-value<0.01). This result also holds in 
column 4, when we use R&D intensity to construct the proxy for growth opportunities. 
The results presented above support Hypothesis 1 developed in section 2. They validate the 
theories that present covenants as a way for creditors to monitor managers, and suggest that creditors 
do not respond to covenant violations mechanically but rather act to address firm-specific conditions.  
---- Insert Table 5A about here ---- 
An additional test to support this story would be to show that creditors are indeed more likely to 
forgive a covenant violation to a firm with many growth opportunities than to a firm with few growth 
opportunities. As explained in Section 3.2, it is difficult to identify which firms were granted creditor 
forgiveness because even when creditors grant a waiver, such waiver is likely to entail some 
conditions. We can however focus on a particular aspect related to waivers and look at amendments to 
loan contracts, i.e. changes in loan terms such as maturity or interest rates, which are recorded in 
Dealscan. In particular, we construct a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if there is an amendment to 
the loan contract at a given quarter and 0 otherwise. In Table 5B, we use this variable to estimate the 
probability of an amendment in the quarter following a covenant violation depending on growth 
opportunities. As expected, we find that firms with many growth opportunities are less likely to 
amend a loan contract following a covenant violation than firms with few growth opportunities. 
Finally, we investigate further the link between creditors’ influence over a firm and changes in 
investment following a covenant violation. In doing so, we examine whether the strength of a lending 
relationship, as measured by the number of historical lending relationships between the firm and a 
current lender during the sample period, affects the results. The idea is that repeated lending 
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relationships facilitate the gathering of soft and hard information about the firm, which helps mitigate 
asymmetric information concerns about the value of growth opportunities or about whether a manager 
has the skill to make them succeed, in the spirit of Diamond (1991), for example. A creditor with a 
stronger lending relationship may also be more concerned about the potential reputational costs of 
failing to fully support a firm with strong growth prospects (as in Dahiya et al., 2003). Columns 3 and 
4 of Table 5B show that a strong lending relationship matters in particular when a firm has many 
growth opportunities, with a marginal increase in investment of around 1.4% after a covenant 
violation relative to a firm with many growth opportunities but without such lending relationship. A 
firm with few growth opportunities does not seem to benefit from a lending relationship.  
Although we do not use data on waivers, these results suggest that creditors take different 
considerations into account when a firm has many growth opportunities - involving eventually more 
waivers, captured here by increased investment and less debt contract amendments following a 
covenant violation – relative to when a firm has few growth opportunities - involving eventually less 
waivers, captured here by decreased investment and more debt contract amendments following a 
covenant violation. 
---- Insert Table 5B about here ---- 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis: Implications for Performance 
 We next investigate whether a covenant violation, and subsequent creditor intervention, has any 
impact on firm performance differentiating between firms with many and few growth opportunities. 
To gain insight into this issue, we estimate the same empirical model as in Section 4.2. using a 
performance-related variable as a dependent variable. This is the empirical model: 
1 0 1 2
3 4 , 1
it it it
it it i t i t
Performance Covenant violation Covenant violation Growthopportunities
Growthopportunities X
              
 (3) 
where Performanceit+ 1 is operating performance (ROA). The parameters of interest are Ȗ1 and Ȗ2, with 
Ȗ1 expected to be positive and Ȗ1+Ȗ2> 0, according to Hypothesis 2 developed in section 2. We also 
estimate the model taking as a dependent variable performance two quarters after the covenant 
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violation (Performanceit+ 2) and we impose as in section 4.2 that there is no covenant violation in 
quarter t+ 1.  
 In columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 we advance the dependent variable by one quarter (ROAit+ 1), 
while in columns 2 and 4 we advance the dependent variable by two quarters (ROAit+ 2). According to 
Column 1, operating performance increases by 0.4% in the quarter following a covenant violation 
when a firm has few growth opportunities, which corresponds to an increase of 20% relative to an 
average ROA of around 2% in non-violating quarters (Panel C from Table 4). Moreover, the 
interaction term has a coefficient that is positive and significant, meaning that a firm with many 
growth opportunities experiences an even stronger improvement in operating performance. 
Specifically, when a firm has many growth opportunities the increase in performance associated with 
the covenant violation is equal to 0.6%, or 15.8% relative to an average ROA of 3.8% in non-violating 
quarters (Panel C from Table 4). Using R&D intensity as an alternative proxy for growth 
opportunities yields very similar results that persist for two quarters following the violation. All 
results provide support to Hypothesis 2. 
---- Insert Table 6 about here ---- 
4.4 Robustness Analysis 
In order to test for the robustness of our claims, we provide additional evidence of our 
theoretical arguments using alternative proxies and specifications. 
 One particular concern that emerges from our study is whether our results are affected by the 
fact that a firm might be compelled to subject its investment policy to the control of creditors even 
before a covenant violation. This happens whenever loan contracts contain covenants on capital 
expenditures. In particular, one could worry about the fact that firms with growth opportunities are 
precisely those firms that avoid including such covenants in loan contracts to ensure maximum 
flexibility in their investment policy. To control for this possibility, in Table 7 we include an 
additional variable that captures the presence of such covenants (Covenant Capex). We show that 
covenants on capital expenditures decrease investment but hardly alter the magnitude or significance 
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of the coefficient of Covenant violation ×  Growth Opportunities. This result holds regardless of how 
we measure growth opportunities. 
---- Insert Table 7 about here ---- 
In Table 8, we distinguish between a violation of the current ratio covenant and of the 
aggregate (tangible) net worth covenant. We find that the reduction in investment measured by the 
coefficient of the Covenant violation term is not always steeper but is certainly more significant for 
the latter than for the former. The increase in investment when there are growth opportunities is also 
weaker in terms of magnitude and significance following a violation of the net worth covenant. These 
results seem to suggest that the violation of the net worth covenant has more serious implications for 
potential default and bankruptcy, whereas the violation of the current ratio covenant warns of the 
possibility of a liquidity problem that may be easier to tackle with the help of creditors.12  
---- Insert Table 8 about here ---- 
A further issue that arises from our analysis is whether the market-to-book ratio measures not 
only growth opportunities but also expectations for costs of financial distress. In this way, a violating 
firm identified as having few growth opportunities could also be a firm whose high (expected) costs 
of financial distress push down the market value of its growth opportunities. We already deal with this 
problem when we introduce R&D intensity as an alternative proxy for growth opportunities and show 
that it yields results that are quantitatively very similar. An additional test is as follows. If it is true 
that a low market-to-book ratio captures high costs of financial distress, the effect in our variables of 
interest should disappear once we focus on firms associated with high costs of financial distress, for 
example, firms that are more likely to go bankrupt. To show that this is not the case, in specification 
(2) we include an interaction term of the covenant violation dummy with the Z-score variable that is 
also interacted with the growth opportunities variable, as proxied by the market-to-book ratio. 
According to the results presented in Table 9 the coefficient of the interaction term Covenant violation 
×  Z-score is significantly positive, which leads us to conclude that a firm that is more likely to go 
                                                          
12
 We thank a referee for providing this intuition. 
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bankrupt invests less after a covenant violation. However, there is hardly any change in the 
coefficients for the variables Covenant violation and Covenant violation× Growth Opportunities 
relative to the original results, which indicates that the Growth Opportunities variable proxied by the 
market-to-book ratio is unlikely to be capturing costs of financial distress. 
---- Insert Table 9 about here ---- 
Finally, an additional concern is that if it is true that a firm with many growth opportunities 
benefits from covenant violations we should see these firms willingly including as many covenants as 
possible in loan contracts in exchange for a lower cost of debt. The empirical evidence on this issue is 
mixed.13 Therefore, a pertinent question is whether there are differential effects of a covenant 
violation conditional contingent on growth opportunities on other aspects of corporate policies such as 
mergers and acquisitions, CEO turnover or dividend and capital structure policy. We assess some of 
these elements in Table 10. 
We obtain data on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) -another form of investment- from SDC 
Platinum, and CEO turnover from EXECUCOMP. Because these data are compiled on a yearly basis, 
we examine cumulative M&A and turnover during the two and four quarters following a covenant 
violation.14  Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A, present the results for (the likelihood of) an M&A. In line 
with the general result on investment from Table 5A we find that there is a decrease in the probability 
of engaging in an M&A following a covenant violation. However this result is attenuated when a firm 
has many growth opportunities. In columns 3 and 4 of Panel A, we conduct the probit estimation of 
CEO turnover. In line with the qualitative results in Nini et al. (2012), we find that a covenant 
violation increases the probability of CEO turnover four quarters following the violation, and this 
                                                          
13
 For example, Nash et al. (2003) find that there is a negative relation between the incidence of (some) 
covenants and growth opportunities, while Bradley and Roberts (2004) find the opposite. 
14
 We have also conducted estimations of annual M&A and CEO turnover data using cumulative covenant 
violations. In this case, the dependent variables are advanced by one year. The results are similar to those 
presented in Panel A of Table 10. 
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effect is stronger when the firm has many growth opportunities. In columns 1 and 2 of Panel B, we 
evaluate the dividend policy of the firm by looking at the payout ratio one and two quarters following 
a covenant violation. If creditors exert a tighter control over the firm, we should see (as we do) a 
decrease in such ratio that occurs independently of the level of growth opportunities. Finally, the 
results from columns 3 and 4 of Panel B show that debt issuance decreases following a covenant 
violation, which is as shown by Roberts in Sufi (2009b). However, this effect is attenuated when a 
firm has many growth opportunities, which may be because these firms require extra funds to be able 
to continue investing following a covenant violation. 
---- Insert Table 10 about here ---- 
 Overall, these results provide a more solid ground to our story because they indicate that from 
the point of view of managers and shareholders, there are still reasons to avoid covenants and 
covenant violations regardless of the level of growth opportunities. This is due to an increase in the 
probability of CEO turnover and to dividend payment cuts following a covenant violation.  
4.5 Further tests: Causality 
The previous analysis does not allow us to address causality between a covenant violation and 
changes in corporate investment since we cannot fully disentangle the effect of a covenant violation 
from changes in the firm’s investment opportunity set. Therefore, the empirical findings presented 
above are mainly descriptive.  
Chava and Roberts (2010) conduct a regression discontinuity design to show that a covenant 
violation generates changes in investment but without addressing the issue of growth opportunities.15 
We can, however, follow their approach by estimating the following model:  
Investment
it+1 = b 0ICovenant  violationit + b 1 1 - I( )Covenant  violationit
                         + f 0IXit + f 1 1 - I( )Xit + h i + n t + e it+1 (4) 
                                                          
15
 See e.g. Roberts and Whited (2012) for a description of the regression discontinuity methodology. 
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where I is an indicator function equal to 1 when the firm has few growth opportunities at a given 
quarter and zero otherwise. Growth opportunities are measured as defined in Section 3.3 and all 
control variables are the same as before. The parameters of interest are ȕ0 and ȕ1, which are expected 
to be negative and positive, respectively, according to Hypothesis 1 developed in section 2 and the 
results in section 4.2. This procedure is similar to estimating equation (2) separately for two samples – 
the sample with many growth opportunities and the sample with low growth opportunities – except 
that in equation (4) the error terms are not interacted with the indicator function. This is a neater 
procedure to isolate the effect of a covenant violation.  
We report the results in Table 11. They are consistent in terms of magnitude and significance 
with those results reported in Table 5A. In particular, we find that investment decreases by around 
0.8% of capital in the quarter following a covenant violation when a firm has few growth 
opportunities, while it increases by around 0.8% of capital when a firm has many growth 
opportunities.16 
---- Insert Table 11 about here ---- 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we present evidence that creditors’ effect on investment decisions can be quite 
complex in the sense that they can help shape the firm’s investment policy, even if this means 
supporting shareholders and managers in their actions. We confirm previous findings that investment 
declines following a covenant violation but we offer evidence that this result is affected by the firm’s 
                                                          
16
 We have also carried out an instrumental variable fixed-effect estimation using as instrument of covenant 
violation a prediction of this variable in terms of Growth Opportunities, Default Distance, (Default Distance)2, 
Size, Leverage, Cash-flow and Z-score. The results, available upon request, show that there are no major 
differences relative to the results in the paper - the main difference is that the coefficients of the main 
explanatory variables are slightly less negative or equivalently more positive. This outcome indicates that the 
(negative) reverse causality from investment to covenant violation is much less important than the causality 
proposed from covenant violation to investment. 
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investment opportunity set at the time of violation. Specifically, we use different proxies for growth 
opportunities to show that investment does not necessarily decrease, and may even increase, following 
a covenant violation when the violating firm has many growth opportunities at the time of violation. 
The results suggest that creditors value growth opportunities as a source of future cash flows that 
enable a firm to repay its outstanding debt. 
We also document that firm operating performance improves shortly after a covenant violation, 
in particular when the firm has many growth opportunities. However, CEO turnover increases and 
payout ratios decrease regardless of the level of growth opportunities. 
 Overall, we interpret this evidence as suggesting that creditors’ influence on firms that violate 
covenants seems to depend on firm characteristics at the time of violation. This is consistent with the 
existing literature that presents covenants and covenant violations as tripwires that enhance the 
flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting. It is also in line with the empirical literature that 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Current ratio (CR)  current assets / current liabilities 
Net worth (NW) total assets - total liabilities 
Tangible net worth (TNW) current assets + net plant, property, and equipment + other assets - total liabilities 
CR default distance  current ratio - covenant current ratio threshold 
NW default distance net worth - covenant net worth threshold 
TNW default distance tangible net worth - covenant tangible net worth threshold 
Default Distance relative minimum {CR default distance, NW default distance, TNW default distance} 
Covenant violation variable equal to 1 if CR, NW and/or TNW default distance is negative. It is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Investment capital expenditures adjusted for fiscal quarter / lagged net property plan and equipment. 
Growth opportunities 
variable equal to 1 if the market-to-book ratio (R&D expenses over sales) exceeds 
the sample median of the market-to-book ratio (R&D expenses over sales) for the 
last four consecutive quarters (from current quarter to current-3). It is equal to 0 
otherwise. 
ROA operating income before depreciation / total assets 
Total debt debt in current liabilities + long term debt 
Market-to-book ratio (market value of equity + total debt) / total assets   
Size log of total assets deflated by the all-urban CPI (year 2000) 
Leverage total debt / total assets 
Cash-flow (income before extraordinary items + depreciation) / lagged net property plan and 
equipment 
(Altman’s) Z-score 3.3 × A + 0.99 × B + 0.6 × C + 1.2 × D + 1.4 × E; where A=EBIT / total assets; B=net sales 
/ total assets; C=market value of equity / total liabilities; D=working capital/total assets; 
E=retained earnings /total assets.  
Liquidity cash / lagged net property plan and equipment 
Covenant Capex variable equal to 1 if an outstanding loan at a given quarter includes a covenant on 
capital expenditures. It is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Payout ratio dividends / EBITDA 
Debt issuance  (total debt – lagged total debt) / total assets 
Spread total (fees and interests) annual spread paid over LIBOR for each dollar drawn 
down from the loan (All-in Spread Drawn variable from Dealscan). 
Maturity maturity of a loan in months 
Amendment variable equal to 1 if there is a change in the terms of an outstanding loan contract 
as reported in Dealscan. It is equal to 0 otherwise. 
Lending Relationship variable equal to 1 if the firm has more than one previous lending relationship with 





Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
The table presents summary statistics – means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum – of 
loan and firm characteristics variables. The sample is composed of non-financial firms in the 
intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 
2008 for which we have information on at least one of the following covenants: current ratio, 
tangible net worth or net worth. Net worth, Tangible net worth and Size are in millions of 
dollars, Spread is in basis points and Maturity is in months. The variable Size is not in log terms 
in this table. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Spread  206.399 126.174 1.5 610 
Maturity 35.529 20.528 1 276 
Covenant violation 0.090 0.286 0 1 
Current ratio 3.195 8.964 0.277 25.586 
Net worth 610.212 3330.5 0.131 10600 
Tangible net worth  211.255 1450 1.001 8650.0 
ROA (%) 2.367 5.602 -0.906 11.945 
Market-to-book 1.943 1.611 0.262 39.584 
Investment 0.040 0.348 0.000 32.933 
Size 1757.605 11009 0.208 29197 
Cash-flow 0.183 3.261 -4.122 3.195 
Leverage 0.517 0.280 0.011 1.289 
Z-score 6.404 10.578 0.11 36.65 





Table 3: T-test contingent on Growth opportunities 
The table presents a test of mean differences for loan and firm characteristics between two different 
subsamples. These subsamples are stratified according to whether a firm-quarter observation is 
classified as having many or few growth opportunities. A firm has many (few) growth opportunities at 
a given quarter when the market-to-book ratio is above (below) the sample median for the last four 
consecutive quarters. The sample is composed of non-financial firms in the intersection of the 
Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 2008 for which we have 
information on at least one of the following covenants: current ratio, tangible net worth or net worth. 
Net worth, Tangible net worth and Size are in millions of dollars, Spread is in basis points and 







Spread 185.736 216.540 0.000 
Maturity 34.467 36.050 0.000 
Covenant violation 0.042 0.114 0.000 
Current ratio 3.611 2.991 0.000 
Net worth 684 574 0.000 
Tangible net worth 224 205 0.000 
ROA(%) 3.772 1.678 0.000 
Market-to-book 3.173 1.340 0.000 
Investment 0.047 0.037 0.000 
Size 1443 1912 0.100 
Cash-flow 0.278 0.136 0.005 
Leverage 0.453 0.548 0.000 
Z-score 7.230 5.998 0.000 




Table 4: T-test contingent on Covenant Violation and Growth opportunities 
Panel A presents correlations between the variables Investment, ROA, Market-to-book ratio and 
Covenant violation. Panel B presents a test of mean differences for the variables Investment, ΔInvestment 
(Investment (t+1) – Investment (t)), ROA and Market-to-book ratio between two subsamples (p-values 
reported). These subsamples are stratified according to whether a firm-quarter observation is identified as 
being in violation or not. Panel C presents a test of mean differences for the same variables creating two 
additional subsamples (p-values reported). These subsamples are stratified according to whether a firm-
quarter observation is identified as being in violation (or not) and the firm is classified as having many (or 
few) growth opportunities. A firm has many (few) growth opportunities at a given quarter when the 
market-to-book ratio is above (below) the sample median for the last four consecutive quarters. The 
sample is composed of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan 
databases during the period from 1996 to 2008 for which we have information on at least one of the 
following covenants: current ratio, tangible net worth or net worth. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
PANEL A 
  Investment ROA Market-to-book Covenant violation   
Investment  1      
ROA  0.109*** 1     
Market-to-book 0.048** 0.051** 1   
Covenant violation  -0.040* -0.177*** -0.076*** 1  
 
PANEL B 
 Violation No Violation p-value 
Investment 0.036 0.043 0.000 
ΔInvestment -0.005 0.001 0.000 
ROA(%) 0.400 3.010 0.000 
Market-to-book 1.204 2.177 0.000 
PANEL C 
 Many growth opportunities Few growth opportunities 
 Violation No violation Violation No Violation 
Investment 0.051 0.045 0.029 0.039 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) 
ΔInvestment 0.002 0.001 -0.008 0.001 
p-value (0.107) (0.000) 
ROA (%) 2.031 3.802 0.050 2.007 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) 
Market-to-book  2.004 3.281 1.050 1.359 
p-value (0.016) (0.000) 
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Table 5A: The Effect of Covenant Violations on Investment 
  The table reports the results of the fixed-effect estimations of Investment (led by one quarter in columns 1 and 3 and by two quarters in columns 2 and 4) on 
Covenant violation, Growth Opportunities, the interaction term Covenant violation× Growth Opportunities and other control variables. In columns 1 and 2 the 
proxy for growth opportunities is based on the market-book ratio, while in columns 3 and 4 it is based on R&D intensity. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. 
This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 2008, which are 
bound by a covenant on the current ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. All specifications include time dummies and 
standard errors are clustered at a firm level. 
VARIABLES Investment (t+1) (M/B) Investment (t+2) (M/B) Investment (t+1) (R&D) Investment (t+2) (R&D) 
Covenant violation -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (-4.410) (-5.540) (-3.997) (-3.112) 
Covenant violation×Growth Opportunities 0.014** 0.016*** 0.016** 0.010** 
 (2.216) (6.803) (2.092) (1.961) 
Growth Opportunities 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.003* 0.002 
 (6.544) (7.300) (1.657) (1.364) 
Default Distance 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.927) (1.016) (0.924) (0.110) 
(Default Distance)2 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.775) (0.828) (-1.440) (-0.642) 
Size -0.016* -0.014** -0.013 -0.001 
 (-1.689) (-2.492) (-0.767) (0.590) 
Leverage -0.948** -1.256*** -2.889** -2.717*** 
 (-2.395) (-3.421) (-2.234) (-2.612) 
Cash-flow 0.015*** 0.011** 0.008 0.039 
 (4.570) (2.455) (0.417) (1.154) 
Z-score 0.104 0.077* 0.531 0.173*** 
 (1.027) (1.670) (1.106) (2.603) 
Liquidity -0.065** -0.046** -0.059*** -0.069* 
 (-2.325) (-2.464) (-2.876) (1.732) 
Intercept 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.034 0.035* 
 (2.718) (3.952) (0.708) (1.722) 
Observations 21,573 20,805 21573 20,805 
R2 (%) 9.85% 8.19% 14.93% 14.24% 
Fitness test (F test) 35.19 (0,000) 27.71 (0.000) 56.53 (0.000) 51.57 (0.000) 






Table 5B: The Effect of Covenant Violations on Investment: Amendments and Relationship Lending 
 Columns 1 and 2 of this table report the results of probit regressions for the probability of a loan amendment (led by one quarter). Columns 3 and 4 report the results of fixed-effect estima-
tions of Investment (led by one quarter)  including lending relationship and other control variables. In columns 1 and 3 the proxy for growth opportunities is based on the market-book ratio, 
while in columns 2 and 4 it is based on R&D intensity. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Deals-
can databases during the period from 1996 to 2008, which are bound by a covenant on the current ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. All specifi-
cations include time dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm level.  
VARIABLES Amendment (t+1) (M/B) Probit 
Amendment (t+1) (R&D) 
Probit 
Investment (t+1) (M/B) Investment (t+1) (R&D) 
Covenant violation 0.214*** 0.176*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (7.208) (2.915) (-4.105) (-3.591) 
Covenant violation × Growth Opportunities -0.076*** -0.038** 0.012** 0.012*** 
 (-3.526) (-2.062) (2.196) (2.645) 
Cov. Viol. × Growth Opport. × Lending Relationship   0.014** 0.015** 
   (2.313) (2.150) 
Cov. Violation × Lending Relationship   -0.008 0.002 
   (-0.942) (0.381) 
Growth Opportunities -0.045** -0.122* 0.015*** 0.006* 
 (-1.943) (-1.646) (3.547) (1.680) 
Lending Relationship   0.001 0.007* 
   (1.074) (1.971) 
Growth Opportunities × Lending Relationship   0.016 0.016 
   (1.059) (1.363) 
Default Distance -0.024 -0.060 0.001 -0.000 
 (-1.058) (-1.137) (1.259) (-0.084) 
(Default Distance)2 -0.568* -0.200 0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.804) (-1.086) (0.398) (-0.062) 
Size 0.111 0.220* -0.021* -0.012 
 (0.182) (1.658) (-1.661) (-0.465) 
Leverage 1.634*** 0.381* -1.138*** -2.464* 
 (4.820) (1.841) (-2.888) (-1.814) 
Cash-flow -0.071 -0.877 0.019*** 0.041* 
 (-1.240) (-1.110) (5.737) (1.744) 
Z-score 0.010 0.054* 0.083 0.417* 
 (1.240) (1.650) (0.564) (1.853) 
Liquidity -0.250** -0.403* -0.093*** -0.059** 
 (-2.071) (-1.881) (-6.922) (-2.333) 
Intercept 0.118*** 0.129*** 0.013* 0.014 
 (13.430) (11.727) (1.784) (0.672) 
Observations 21,573 21,573 21,573 21,573 
R2 (%) 20.28% 27.20% 10.28% 15.20% 
Fitness test 76.88 (0.000) 108.86 (0.000) 34.63 (0.000) 52.24 (0.000) 
    Robust t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: The Effect of Covenant Violations on Operating Performance 
The table reports the results of the fixed-effect estimations of ROA (led by one quarter in columns 1 and 3 and two quarters in columns 2 and 4) on Covenant violation, 
Growth Opportunities, the interaction term Covenant violation× Growth Opportunities and other control variables. In columns 1 and 2 the proxy for growth 
opportunities is based on the market-book ratio, while in columns 3 and 4 it is based on R&D intensity. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. This is a sample of non-
financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 2008, which are bound by a covenant on the current 
ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. All specifications include time dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm level. 
VARIABLES ROA (t+1) (M/B) ROA (t+2) (M/B) ROA (t+1) (R&D) ROA (t+2) (R&D) 
Covenant violation 0.004*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002** 
 (3.225) (1.951) (2.933) (1.969) 
Covenant violation×Growth Opportunities 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003***  0.002*** 
 (3.594) (3.050)  (3.410) (7.297) 
Growth Opportunities 0.013*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.002 
 (19.065) (11.172) (0.022) (0.514) 
Default Distance 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.006 
 (1.212) (0.260) (1.014) (1.286) 
(Default Distance)2 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.019 
 (0.470) (0.507) (-0.155) (-0.748) 
Size -0.009** -0.010* -0.009** -0.020*** 
 (-2.314) (-1.654) (-1.986) (-3.647) 
Leverage 0.148*** 0.046** 0.105** 0.158*** 
 (7.230) (2.028) (2.390) (6.531) 
Cash-flow -0.000 -0.000 -0.061** -0.029** 
 (-0.272) (-1.282) (1.969) (-2.064) 
Z-score 0.025* 0.010** 0.033** 0.018** 
 (1.718) (2.323) (1.991) (2.487) 
Liquidity 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.027* 0.024* 
 (3.425) (2.922) (1.694) (1.863) 
Intercept 0.030*** 0.022*** 0.037 0.019 
 (8.406) (6.369) (0.967) (0.527) 
Observations (firms) 21,573 20,805 21,573 20,805 
R2 (%) 6.02% 5.95% 10.08% 8.26% 
Fitness test (F test) 20.63 (0.000) 19.65 (0.000) 39.00 (0.000) 27.97 (0.000) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: Robustness Analysis. Covenant on Capital Expenditures 
The table reports the results of the fixed-effect estimations of Investment (led by one quarter in columns 1 and 3 and by two quarters in columns 2 and 4) on 
Covenant violation, Growth Opportunities, the interaction term Covenant violation ×  Growth Opportunities and other control variables. In columns 1 and 2 
the proxy for growth opportunities is based on the market-book ratio, while in columns 3 and 4 it is based on R&D intensity. Variable definitions appear in 
Table 1. This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 2008, 
which are bound by a covenant on the current ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. All specifications include time 
dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm level. 
VARIABLES Investment (t+1) (M/B) Investment (t+2) (M/B) Investment (t+1) (R&D) Investment (t+2) (R&D) 
Covenant violation -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 (-4.294) (-5.382) (-2.618) (-3.286) 
Covenant violation×Growth Opportunities 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (6.526) (7.246) (1.993) (2.342) 
Growth Opportunities 0.012** 0.016*** 0.001 0.002 
 (2.183) (6.775) (0.498) (0.545) 
Covenant Capex -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 (-5.649) (-5.819) (-3.580) (-3.320) 
Default Distance 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.024) (1.005) (-1.328) (-1.222) 
(Default Distance)2 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.864) (0.856) (-1.082) (-1.544) 
Size -0.016* -0.014*** -0.012 -0.008 
 (-1.761) (-2.621) (-0.980) (-0.759) 
Leverage -0.916** -1.229*** -2.997*** -1.975** 
 (-2.343) (-6.284) (-3.041) (-2.205) 
Cash-flow 0.015*** 0.011** 0.037 0.010 
 (4.467) (2.441) (0.850) (0.222) 
Z-score 0.109 0.080* 0.014 0.118*** 
 (1.071) (1.729) (0.129) (2.702) 
Liquidity -0.064** -0.035** -0.030* -0.030* 
 (-2.255) (-2.411) (-1.646) (-1.736) 
Intercept 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.020 0.017 
 (3.243) (4.710) (0.147) (0.978) 
Observations 21,573 20,805 21,573 20,805 
R2 (%) 10.40% 8.71% 15.97% 14.66% 
Fitness test (F test) 36.78 (0.000) 29,15 (0.000) 60.23(0.000) 52.49 (0.000) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Robustness Analysis. Analysis by covenant type 
The table reports the results of the fixed-effect estimations of Investment (led by one period) on Covenant violation, Growth Opportunities, the interaction term 
Covenant violation× Growth Opportunities and other control variables. We distinguish between a current ratio covenant violation (columns 1 and 3) and a net worth 
(or tangible net worth) covenant violation (columns 2 and 4). In columns 1 and 2, the proxy for growth opportunities is based on the market-book ratio while in 
columns 3 and 4 it is based on R&D intensity. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, 
Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 2008. Specifications include time dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm level, 
VARIABLES Investment (t+1) (M/B) 
CR 
Investment (t+1) (M/B) 
NW+TNW 
Investment (t+1) (R&D) 
CR 
Investment (t+1) (R&D) 
NW+TNW 
Covenant violation -0.014* -0.007*** -0.003 -0.010*** 
 (-1.691) (-4.900) (-0.315) (-9.851) 
Covenant violation×Growth Opportunities 0.043** 0.005 0.025** 0.007* 
 (2.397) (1.079) (2.566) (1.741) 
Growth Opportunities 0.033*** 0.012*** 0.002 0.005** 
 (4.946) (4.955) (0.369) (2.038) 
Default Distance 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.345) (1.216) (0.714) (1.341) 
(Default Distance)2 -0.008 0.001 -0.010 0.001 
 (-1.572) (0.972) (-1.493) (1.474) 
Size 0.115 -0.023** -0.013 -0.021*** 
 (1.489) (-2.367) (-0.371) (-2.769) 
Leverage -0.789 -1.481*** -1.640 -2.902** 
 (-1.574) (-3.014) (-1.440) (-1.981) 
Cash-flow 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.029 0.004 
 (3.208) (4.296) (1.070) (1.094) 
Z-score 0.008 0.167 1.633 0.103 
 (0.042) (1.322) (1.428) (0.688) 
Liquidity -0.052*** -0.074*** -0.178** -0.048** 
 (-6.407) (-2.694) (-2.124) (-2.115) 
Intercept 0.043** 0.012 0.008 0.042*** 
 (2.242) (1.402) (0.240) (3.765) 
Observations  4427 18352 4427 18352 
R2 (%) 8.28 12.00 6.22 10.80 
Fitness test (F test) 5.73*** 37.27*** 4.21*** 33.09*** 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 9: Robustness Analysis. The Effect of Covenant Violations on Investment. Interaction effects 
The table reports the results of the fixed-effect estimations of Investment (led by one quarter in column 1 and by two 
quarters in column 2) on Covenant violation, Growth Opportunities, the interaction term Covenant violation ×  Growth 
Opportunities and other control variables. We include interaction terms with the default risk variable (Covenant viola-
tion ×  Z-score; Covenant violation ×  Z-score ×  Growth Opportunities). The proxy for growth opportunities is based 
on the market-book ratio. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersec-
tion of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 2008, which are bound by a cov-
enant on the current ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. All specifications 
include time dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm level. 
VARIABLES Investment (t+1) (M/B) Investment (t+2) (M/B) 
Covenant violation -0.010*** -0.009*** 
 (-4.565) (-5.961) 
Covenant violation×Growth Opportunities 0.014** 0.015*** 
 (2.164) (5.691) 
Growth Opportunities 0.014*** 0.011*** 
 (6.693) (7.616) 
Covenant violation × Z-score 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (2.700) (2.772) 
Cov. Viol.×Z-score × Growth Opportunities 0.000 0.000 
 (0.366) (0.132) 
Default Distance 0.001 0.000 
 (0.920) (0.028) 
(Default Distance)2 -0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.596) (-0.420) 
Size -0.018* -0.008* 
 (-1.749) (-1.644) 
Leverage -1.177*** -1.084*** 
 (-2.675) (-4.991) 
Cash-flow 0.017*** 0.015** 
 (4.422) (2.153) 
Z-score 0.077 0.094* 
 (0.597) (1.722) 
Liquidity -0.069** -0.074** 
 (-2.448) (-2.327) 
Intercept 0.025* 0.026*** 
 (1.774) (3.858) 
Observations 21,573 20,805 
R2 (%) 11.30% 10.51% 
Fitness test (F test) 39.73 (0.000) 35.28 (0.000) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Robustness Analysis. Extensions (Mergers and acquisitions (M&A), CEO turnover, Dividend payout, Debt issuance) 
The table reports the results of the estimations of M&A, CEO turnover, Dividend payout ratio and Debt issuance. Panel A presents Probit estimations, while Panel 
B presents fixed effect estimations. The dependent variables in Panel A are led by two (columns 1 and 3) and four quarters (columns 2 and 4), while in Panel B 
they are led by one (columns 1 and 3) and two quarters (columns 2 and 4). CEO turnover is extracted from EXECUCOMP, while M&A is extracted from SDC 
Platinum. Control variables are the same as in Table 6A, except for Debt issuance in which we exclude the explanatory variable Leverage to avoid endogeneity 
issues. Variable definitions appear in Table 1. This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during 
the period from 1996 to 2008, which are bound by a covenant on the current ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. The 
variable Growth Opportunities is computed based on the market-to-book ratio. All specifications include time dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm 
level. 




CEO turnover (t+2) 
Probit 
CEO turnover (t+4) 
Probit 
Covenant violation -0.026*** -0.025*** 0.037** 0.069** 
 (-6.200) (-6.031) (2.100) (2.180) 
Covenant violation×Growth Opportunities 0.028*** 0.021** 0.035** 0.010* 
 (3.650) (2.870) (3.880) (1.741) 
Growth Opportunities 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.002 0.036 
 (8.670) (8.400) (1.007) (0.140) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 20805 20037 7503 7226 
R2 (%) 10.24% 7.58% 2.69% 2.55% 
Fitness test (LR test) 35.31 (0.000) 24.44 (0.000) 3.07 (0.000) 2.83 (0.000) 
VARIABLES (PANEL B) Payout (t+1) Payout (t+2) Debt issuance (t+1) Debt issuance (t+2) 
Covenant violation -0.102*** -0.113** -0.063*** -0.100** 
 (-2.501) (-2.590) (-2.790) (-1.975) 
Covenant violation × Growth Opportunities 0.182 0.042 0.083* 0.080* 
 (0.570) (0.251) (1.720) (1.720) 
Growth Opportunities 0.020 0.096 -0.006** -0.004* 
 (0.180) (0.133) (-2.709) (-1.820) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,573 20,805 21,573 20,805 
R2 (%) 4.50% 3.60% 12.08% 8.82% 
Fitness test (F test) 15.18 (0.000) 11.60 (0.000) 44.26 (0.000) 30.04 (0.000) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 41 
Table 11. Robustness Analysis. The Effect of Covenant Violations on Investment. Interactions 
   The table reports the results of the fixed-effect estimations of Investment (led by one quarter in columns 1 and 3 and by two quarters in columns 2 and 4) on 
Covenant violation, Growth Opportunities, the interaction term Covenant violation× Growth Opportunities and other control variables as shown in specifica-
tion (4) in the main text. Each explanatory variable is interacted with two dummies variables. On the one hand, Few-growth opportunities that is equal to 1 if 
the proxy for growth opportunities does not exceed the sample median for the last four consecutive quarters and 0 otherwise. On the other hand, High-growth 
opportunities that is equal to 1 if the proxy for growth opportunities exceeds the sample median for the last four consecutive quarters and 0 otherwise. In col-
umns 1 and 2 the proxy for growth opportunities is based on the market-book ratio, while in columns 3 and 4 it is based on R&D intensity. Variable definitions 
appear in Table 1. This is a sample of non-financial firms in the intersection of the Compustat, Sufi’s and Dealscan databases during the period from 1996 to 
2008, which are bound by a covenant on the current ratio or/and on the (tangible) net worth at some point during the sample period. All specifications include 
time dummies and standard errors are clustered at a firm level. 
VARIABLES Investment (t+1) (M/B) Investment (t+2) (M/B) Investment (t+1) (R&D) Investment (t+2) (R&D) 
Covenant violation×Few-growth Opportunities -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** 
 
(-4.050) (-4.874) (-4.056) (-3.140) 
Covenant violation×High-growth Opportunities 0.008** 0.011** 0.009** 0.004** 
 
(1.982) (1.980) (1.998) (1.910) 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21,573 20,805 21,573 20,805 
R2 (%) 11.59% 8.80% 16.10% 16,01 % 
Fitness test (F test) 37.87 (0.000) 26.87 (0.000) 55.43 (0.000) 53.09 (0.000) 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
